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Abstract. The present paper outlines some basic concepts of Alain Badiou’s phi-
losophy of the subject, tracking down its inherent and complex philosophical 
implications. These implications are made explicit in the criticism directed against 
the philosophical sophistry which denies the pertinence of the concept of truth. 
Badiou’s philosophical innovation is based on three nodal concepts, namely truth, 
event and subject, and it must be revealed how the afore-mentioned concepts are 
organized and interrelated, eventually leading to reformulating the concept of the 
subject. In its exercise, philosophy is intimately affiliated to the four adjacent pro-
cedures of mathematics, art, love and politics that could be understood as overall 
conditions on the margins of which philosophical thinking takes place. Separa-
ting philosophy from ontology and charging philosophy with what exceeds being, 
Badiou transforms it to the general theory of the event. Consequently the concept 
of the subject is disconnected from that of the object, the subject being not an 
instance of knowledge, but always a part of generic procedures and thus definable 
simply as a finite fragment or an operative configuration of the traces of the event. 
Therefore, it could be stated that Badiou’s theory of the subject is formal and 
refuses all essentialist connotations.
The state of philosophy
Philosophy as a theoretical discourse in a methodically organized form 
appears to be condemned to extinction: the majority of contemporary 
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philosophical theories have pointed out that philosophy, more than 
ever, is involved in a legitimation crisis. The place philosophy is called 
to occupy in our chaotic world is a widely debated issue amongst phi-
losophers of different backgrounds. What is the function of philosophy? 
How should philosophy be practiced? And there is much discussion on 
the relevance or irrelevance of the concepts philosophy has employed 
and continues to employ. The need for new philosophical concepts 
seems to be widely admitted, but what still troubles philosophical minds 
is the fate we should reserve for the so-called traditional concepts of 
philosophy: should one try to avoid them altogether, should one declare 
a war on them, or should one revise them in the hope of making them 
convenient for our present purposes? The question of balance between 
past concepts and renewed or invented concepts has proved to be a fun-
damental question of nowadays’ philosophical thought. Philosophy’s 
own continuity is at stake and we have to make up our minds in order 
to take sides with what could guarantee the favourable conditions of 
this continuity. 
We will examine Badiou’s philosophy mostly from the following 
point of view: if one approves Badiou’s enthusiastic suggestion that phi-
losophy could be a serious activity with highly practical consequences 
even to our everyday life and its commitments, one is nevertheless 
eager to find out the exact circumstances of this approval and furnish 
a persuasive explanation of the real use of philosophy in our time. This 
means that we have to identify as precisely as possible the central con-
cerns of Badiou’s sophisticated philosophical machinery, constructed 
on the basis of the following idea: after all it makes no sense to speak of 
the end of philosophy because philosophy is precisely a never-ending 
activity with no arrival point to be attained, one should rather explore 
the real conditions that render it possible in reality and provide an 
effective support for its survival.
As far as the state of today’s philosophy is concerned, Badiou cer-
tainly agrees with the wide-spread idea that philosophy has reached 
a crisis, but the main reason, he points out, lies in the fact that phi-
losophy is “paralyzed by its relationship to its own history”, as stated 
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in the emblematic essay The return of philosophy itself (Badiou 1999b: 
113). One may have the feeling that there is something wrong with 
philosophy — philosophy has lost its autonomous spirit and has been 
turned into a kind of exegesis of other disciplines, be it arts, science, 
politics or others. Or, interpreted in more pessimistic terms, philo-
sophy has been disposed of its own nature, its active and combating 
mood, and has become an independent form of study, not only an 
object in a museum, but the museum itself, containing by-gone con-
cepts and theories. Badiou recognises the actual state of philosophy as 
deep-seated ‘malaise’: everything tends to indicate the uselessness and 
purposelessness of philosophy, torn between different fields of study 
called the humanities which are supported by their adequate objects 
of study and convenient methods. So should we think, in the vein of 
some contemporary philosophers, that philosophy has been completely 
done away with while deficient in method and purpose? This narra-
tive about the end of philosophy has in the meantime taken the form 
of religious prophecy, so philosophy itself has been considered in this 
context as a predictive discipline with the purpose of foreseeing its own 
end. What would be the consequence of this? Does everyone who wants 
to practice philosophy and desires to be taken seriously submit to this 
prophetic idea of the end of philosophy? Since philosophy is no longer 
to be identified with metaphysics, one has to start with reassessing the 
place and the meaning of philosophy. Of course it may imply turning 
explicitly to the ways of thinking outside the forms of traditional philo-
sophical discourse.
Badiou’s project of re-evaluating philosophy is somewhat at odds 
with the means he employs: he overtly promotes the idea that philo-
sophy should cease to be a historically determined discipline, even if 
this historical determination has paradoxically been its own implicit 
demand, formulated by outstanding philosophers themselves. Badiou 
declares his position to be critical of the recent critical philosophical 
discourse: he attempts to evaluate the consistency of the philosophical 
discourse in terms of its political and ethical implications. And Badiou 
discovers the true conflict underlying the philosophico-historicist 
63The conceptual structure of Alain Badiou's theory of the subject
disdain for a purely philosophical discourse — that of the hidden 
conflict between pre-Socratic thinking and Plato’s truth-establishing 
thinking. He proposes to overlook the implicit historicist demand and 
to reconsider the meaning and the place of philosophy in the light of a 
radically new imperative consisting of putting the history of philosophy 
into brackets. In order to redefine philosophy, the scope of philosophy 
should be modified — a task far from being accomplished.
Held hostage within the vicious circle drawn by historicist thin-
king, philosophy has to seek to define itself otherwise than by its history, 
identified by common consent with the phenomenon called the western 
metaphysics. According to Badiou we are authorized (by the crisis phi-
losophy encounters these days) to think, contrary to the wide-spread 
opinion emphasizing the fatal variety of philosophic forms of expres-
sion, that it is possible to define what philosophy does or should do and 
that this definition should overlook, as much as possible, the historical 
nature of philosophy. Of course, as a convinced Platonist, Badiou pro-
poses to part from Plato’s philosophy, considering it as the first true 
unveiling of western philosophical thought and opposed to philosophico- 
rhetorical forms. The problem of sophistry still seems to be a central 
question of philosophy: we are moving towards (or probably we have 
already reached) the conception that considers philosophy inseparable 
from sophistry: in Badiou’s terms, sophistry has taken over, especially 
in the 20th century, the place philosophy was meant to occupy. In other 
terms, philosophy has been subordinated to the idea that philosophy, 
not being a matter of truth or truths, is only a matter of discussing, of 
uttering. From this viewpoint, if philosophy is regarded as unable to 
tell the truth, the role of philosophy is reduced to tell what it cannot tell, 
while all contact with the nature of the reality, be it material, spiritual 
or other, seems to be completely irrelevant because unquestionably 
out of reach. This is why Badiou sees Friedrich Nietzsche as well as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein as the symbolic figures of modern sophistry: 
while Nietzsche, in the most general sense, reduced philosophy to un-
conscious forces and desires underlying the philosophical discourse, 
Wittgenstein definitely refused philosophy’s pursuit of truths in favour 
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of innocuous language games, freed from any commitment to recon-
struct so-called reality. So it is not false to interpret Badiou’s position as 
follows: sophistry is anything and any thought that refuses the category 
of truth, truth being not a matter of consensus, of discussion, of rules, 
of norms or of establishment, but of continuous effort and combating 
fidelity. This also means that philosophy is not as much a discipline 
concerned with the meaning and the structure of some kind of a rea- 
lity, otherwise called a ‘text’ or ‘narrative’, as it is mostly concerned 
with what he calls an Event. The latter is not to be understood as an 
element resulting from some kind of a language-based structure, even 
if its character retains some features proper to signifying structures 
in general. So Badiou’s effort to emancipate philosophy from the rule 
of sophistry takes the form of attempting to give a positive defini-
tion to the concept of philosophy. This, however, does not mean that 
sophistry should be done away with altogether. Sophistry is an integral 
part of philosophy and remains the companion of philosophy, intro-
ducing polemic nature where philosopher has lost the sense of criticism 
and yields to dogmatism (Badiou 1999b: 134).
Such a philosophical break-through could only be realised by 
making a clear distinction between the sophistic and the philosophi-
cal way of thinking, the latter consisting of defining philosophy in 
accordance with the concept or category of truth. This, as we have seen, 
should be a basic choice to be made in philosophy: either we maintain 
that there could be no truth to align oneself with because the consis- 
tency (of meaning) is only a matter of language games, rules, signi-
fying units; or we try to reason that truth is not to be looked for in 
some kind of an eternal realm (as this has been the case with Plato, at 
the same time an ally and a father figure to be eliminated by Badiou). 
Truth has to be created, followed and maintained by philosophy as its 
main concern. Of course, Badiou’s position, seen in the light of Nietzs-
chean critical tradition, seems quite uncomfortable; nevertheless, we 
have to try to reconstruct the meaning it contains in order to evaluate 
the position Badiou is defending. How could the category of truth be 
redefined, without doing harm to philosophy’s contemporary develop-
ments, mostly concerned with the lack or the loss of this very category?
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First of all, philosophy is linked to politics, not by external asso-
ciation, but by its inherent engagement that can already be seen in 
Plato’s thought. This link is not lost nowadays, rather we should argue, 
as Badiou suggests, that philosophy is meaningless without politics, as 
politics has no meaning without philosophy. We need not go back to 
Plato in order to study the mutual attachment between philosophy and 
politics, it is enough to consider some contemporary forms of engage-
ment as those of Marx, Heidegger or even philosophy of language in its 
the Anglo-Saxon form, and eventually why not Badiou’s own involve-
ment in some clearly left-wing oriented political movements. Badiou 
wants to convince us that philosophy fails to meet its telos fixed by Plato, 
when one does not understand this inherent link binding philosophy 
and politics together. The question is how this relationship between 
philosophy and politics should be explained using the declaredly 
central category of truth? 
Philosophy and the category of truth
Is truth still thinkable? Could this category still have meaning from 
a philosophical point of view, regardless of its innumerable misuses 
manifested in the history of philosophy? Badiou’s response is tho-
roughly affirmative, although with certain nuances: truth is a matter 
of its conditions as well as of its definition. There is no doubt that for 
Badiou, truth is a central category of philosophy, at least as long as we 
deal with the so-called classical philosophy starting with Plato (but as 
we know, both Heraclites and Parmenides were already dealing with 
this category, Heraclites in the form of logos, Parmenides in that of the 
thought about being). The idea of philosophy that Badiou explores in a 
systematic manner throughout all his recent works (at least beginning 
with Being and Event) could be resumed as follows: there are four basic 
procedures through which truth unveils itself and these procedures are 
mathematics, art, politics and love (for instance, Badiou 1999b: 61). One 
must be surprised and perplexed: what is the common trait between 
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these extremely heterogeneous activities, mental as well as emotional? 
Are these conditions historical or rather purely philosophical? Appa-
rently both, because these conditions open a field proper to the study of 
truth in its pre-reflexive form: there are truths in mathematics (some-
times called science), art, politics and love before philosophy begins 
in its own, conceptual truth. These conditions could be defined as the 
concrete locus where philosophical thinking is rooted and takes place, 
although philosophy never becomes the total of these conditions. This 
means that truth is not the prerogative of philosophy; rather it is the 
turning-point giving birth to philosophical reflection, to conceptual 
framing wherein these conditions may get elucidated but not resumed 
altogether. In addition, truth in Badiou’s conception is not a matter of 
knowledge (savoir, see 1988: 9). Knowledge simply gives us access to 
what is — being, it is unable to explain what happens — the unknown, 
the unexpected, the Event. That is what philosophy is really about — if 
truth ceases to be a part or a criterion of knowledge, philosophy is not 
about what exists, but deals with the coming to existence, with the sin-
gularisation. 
But still the question persists: why is the category of truth indispen-
sable to philosophical way of thinking, why is philosophy inconceivable 
without the implicit presence of the category of truth in the thinker’s 
mind? And how could one characterize the consequences this concept 
has in relation to the thinking subject? Badiou, as we will see, main-
tains the category of truth as central to philosophical thinking, but he 
insists on the heterogeneous nature of truths, which in its turn reflects 
the heterogeneous nature of thinking itself: the essential plurality and 
heterogeneity of truths does not exclude their compossibility (which 
means precisely heterogeneous unity) for thinking. Understood as that, 
truth is never significant in itself, but should be seen as a kind of a sign, 
void of any implicit meaning for philosophical discourse but still more 
or less apt to assume a function in the system of thinking. That is why 
truth is not an artefact produced by philosophy, rather one should say 
that philosophy is kept in motion and operated on the basis of some 
truth or truths. So a philosopher, to be defined as such, declares (as 
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Plato or Descartes do) that there are truths, and even if they are eternal, 
they are condemned to appear in order to be (Badiou 2006: 534–535). 
So some truths could exist together and complete one another within 
the framework of some temporal and at the same time operational 
whole. In this whole the truths of science, art, politics and love meet 
philosophy, the result of this fruitful encounter being a philosophical 
understanding of truths inherent to procedures determined as generic 
by their nature.
This understanding of specific truths (that is to say, of four generic 
procedures) through the looking-glass of philosophy, does it not take 
the form of reduction, devaluation, evanescence of meaning? One 
should rather be assured when seeing that philosophy is not going 
astray in the labyrinth of sense. It is Badiou’s original contribution to 
the renewal of philosophical discourse: philosophy has to withdraw 
from positions won by the philosophies of sense, as well as from those 
regarding the objective order, both being too indeterminate for philo-
sophical thinking. What is left to focus on is the category of truth as the 
only one worthy of philosopher’s consideration. It would be too simple 
to see in this turn a come-back of the eminently Platonist category of 
truth, one has to consider further consequences of the process called 
subtraction. If subtraction consists in evacuating truth from the laby-
rinth of sense, philosophy has to reconsider the meaning of experience 
for the procedures it uses in order to bring out its truths. That is why 
Badiou undertakes a radical shift that one could be tempted to interpret 
as a return to the classical way of thinking philosophically: philosophy 
is not an interpretation of experience and its sense-creating procedures 
(as semiotics would argue alongside with some other disciplines), 
philosophy is to be understood as an operational category subtracted 
from all presence (Badiou 1999b: 69). So, it seems when submitting 
Badiou’s texts to close reading, that philosophy operates precisely in 
this void where sense is neither given nor interpreted (one perceives 
a sharp opposition here to Gilles Deleuze’s position as well as to Jean-
François Lyotard’s definition of philosophy as “a discourse in search 
of his own rules” (Badiou 1999b: 66). Philosophy is constructivist but 
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only in the sense of constructing bridges between truth-procedures 
based on the singular conditions of art, science, love and politics. And 
through these conditions, philosophy moves away from historicist 
tendencies and comes closer to truths operating within the limits of 
time being. But Badiou claims that a distinction should nevertheless be 
made between grasping and producing truths, the first one being the 
properly philosophical way of thinking, the last one leading to disaster 
where philosophy ceases to refer to four generic procedures (who ope-
rate always in the midst of the multiplicity of truths) and gets trapped 
in the illusion of its own supremacy, realized through a double substan-
tialisation of truth and of presence and their consequent objectivation. 
But how is the category of truth connected to the Event and why does 
Badiou maintain so vigorously that truth is always post-eventful?
Preparing the Event
Is there an instance par excellence of being able to grasp truths? What or 
who could be the instance capable of grasping truths? Could truth be a 
place or a site upon which something totally other is founded or at least 
potentially could be founded? There are truths, and every truth itself 
is always and already a multiplicity, but there is ultimately no Truth 
(Badiou 2004: 102), according to Badiou’s conception: if philosophy 
is the meeting place for truth procedures and the point where they 
become compossible, is there a form of truth specific to philosophy and 
also to the philosopher? If, as we have said, philosophy does not consist 
in interpreting empirical data of some subject, philosophy is not a mat-
ter of productivity, there is no interpretation produced, as there is no 
universal truth created (Badiou 1997: 116). And there is a circulation of 
truths through subjects. And there are, Badiou convinces us, subjects, 
always singular, who, being able to accept these truths, affirm them 
through a relentless fidelity, leading back to what Badiou calls Events. 
Before we are able to present the exact meaning of the concept of sub-
ject, we have to ask: what is the nature of an event? What distinguishes 
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an event from what simply happens? To answer this question, we have 
to be clear about the fact that for Badiou, truth is not something known 
and recognized as such, resulting from so-called common sense. Truth, 
as far as it is taken as such, is a matter of exception, it is a deviation in 
relation to the order of things, a deviation in relation to what is or exists 
(see Badiou 2006: 12 and 1988: 196), that is to say, in relation to being 
qua being, as Badiou calls it. Truth, being thus immanently related to 
(the course of) history, is by its very nature eminently revolutionary: it 
enables an advent of something more or less new, it concerns a radical 
change in the course of being qua being. 
In order to reveal the exact meaning of the notion ‘event’ in Badiou’s 
philosophical configuration, one has to begin with significant events 
specific to each domain of the procedures of truth or generic condi-
tions; as Badiou points out, philosophy, being historically sutured to 
these four generic conditions, discovers in them its own prescription of 
return, that is to say, the condition of its own eventfulness. 
But let us first determine the exact configuration in which enter 
philosophy and mathematics: Badiou undertakes the unburdening 
of philosophy in favour of mathematics, the latter being precisely the 
domain of being qua being. We should ask for the reasons for such a 
characterization: why should philosophy free itself from the concept 
which has been considered as central to philosophical reflection for 
centuries? The main reason, one has the impression, should be searched 
in the concept of the One or of the Totalisation: if mathematics “thinks 
being” (Badiou 2004: 97), the One is lurking in the field of mathema-
tics and still is left without elucidation because mathematics will 
never embrace being qua being in its constitution as One. That is why 
Badiou’s philosophy, together with mathematics understood as onto-
logy, is seeking to think being without any totalizing determination. 
This is, by the way, the main theme of discussion Badiou brings forth 
in his book on Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy: when Deleuze’s ontology of 
difference (Deleuze 1968) still reflects back to some common ground or 
field of immanence unified in the principle of Univocity, Badiou refuses 
to share this point of view, arguing that the pure multiple is in fact void 
of any transcendental unity (see Badiou 1999a). So it is philosophy itself 
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that declares mathematics apt to be charged with the task of ontology, 
that is to say with the question about being qua being, whereas philo- 
sophy deals with what exceeds the ontological task as such. This excess 
of ontology, for Badiou, is discovered and embodied in the concept 
called the event. The question what philosophy is about receives an 
accurate and constituent answer: philosophy is, “first and foremost, the 
general theory of the event” (Badiou 2004: 98). Philosophy is above all 
involved with what exceeds both being qua being and the One. More-
over, there is no need for the postponement of the event, the latter must 
be consi-dered as a turning-point from which the generic procedures 
can come into play and truths can be affirmed. What counts is the 
‘after’ of the event.
Even when the concept of being is assigned to mathematics, phi-
losophy is not yet separated once and for all from being. Philosophy 
still addresses being, but it does so in its fragmentary form: philoso-
phy is concerned with what escapes being as totality (counted as one) 
and turns to a concrete situation, or as Badiou puts it, to a singular 
multiplicity, in order to track down the real circumstances of an event. 
Understood as such, an event is not just a happening out of nowhere 
(which would mean simply to Christianise the event), neither is it an 
organic part of a situation, but rather an “inorganic” or, as Badiou puts 
it, generic, in the sense that event occurs on the margins of a situation, 
arranging an evental site. There is no event without a corresponding 
evental site, the latter being an organic part of a situation, although 
strangely loose vis-à-vis the situation it stems from. One is tempted to 
think that the evental site out of which an event occurs must enclose 
some preliminary established opportunity for it. Is it really as simple 
as that? Badiou gives the example of a cat (although any other animal 
as well as human being could serve as an example) whose cells (of 
whatever organ) as living entities belong to the evental site of the cat. 
It is otherwise with the molecules of those cells: these molecules are 
not alive in the sense that cells are alive, so Badiou deduces from this 
example that elements constituting an evental site do not belong to the 
same site, even if these elements are roughly taken as constituent parts 
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of the site. As such, a material constitution of a cat may indeed be divided 
in two: there is a singular multiplicity of living entities, and there is a 
void (or even voids), a vague being identified simply as brute matter, 
previously called being as being. That is how Badiou defines the concept 
of the evental site: “it is a part of a situation all of whose elements are on 
the edge of the void” (Badiou 2004: 99). Philosophy, being “the gene- 
ral theory of the event”, installs itself precisely on this edge, without 
exonerating itself from the task of knowing what mathematics disco-
vers about (or as) being qua being. 
There is a major difficulty inherent to Badiou’s conception of the 
event: how could an event supplement the situation or the evental 
site from which it stems? If, as Badiou argues, a multiple cannot be a 
multiple of itself, an event must constitute a surplus in addition to the 
originary multiple. The examples that Badiou furnishes are not comp-
letely persuasive: to say that “a reflection upon the French Revolution 
is an element of the revolution itself” (Badiou 2004: 100) resembles 
the idea that “spectator is a part of the painting” — there is something 
indeterminate in this kind of conviction because we could never know 
what a painting is (if it exists altogether) without any spectator looking 
at it. It seems to be a matter concerning the extent (mental and other) 
of an event: a reflection can be part of the French Revolution in so far as 
the meaning of an event called the French Revolution requires a reflec-
tion on its meaning (for the somewhat similar case of Saint Paul, see 
Badiou 1997). It does not suffice to have perfect knowledge of dates, 
participants and concrete circumstances of the event; an event sup-
plements the evental site it is a product of. This supplementing should 
not be interpreted as a product of some strangely fortuitous and even 
external element, because an event, in Badiou’s conception, emerges 
from the immanence of a situation, resulting nevertheless in a radical 
transcending of the constituent site.
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Processes of composing the subject
Does this vision of the adventitious character of the event still presume 
a subject capable of carefully assisting and accompanying this advent 
or will the event, as in the case of Louis Althusser’s thought (2003, 1: 
239) where the subject is tied up with ideological connotations (Badiou 
2006: 548), surpass the subjective configuration and go beyond the 
realm of the subject, the latter remaining captive of a factual multiple 
situation? Badiou’s conception of the “subject without object” pro-
vides a key to understanding the radical modification he introduces 
into the concept of the subject. Thus the subject is not the product of 
some objectivity, neither in the Marxist sense where the subject is an 
instance emerging from objective material conditions nor in the posi-
tivist sense where the subject is brought about in conformity with the 
amount of knowledge and the definition of objects. Badiou’s conception 
of truth leads to discarding any theory that, in order to give a defini-
tion of truth, posits some kind of a correspondence theory between 
the subject and object, regardless of the nuances of meaning we would 
confer to these terms. Considering “the problem of the subject with-
out object as central as regards a possible renaissance of philosophy” 
(Badiou 1999b: 93), Badiou makes apparently no concession to either 
Marxist or positivist conception of the subject, although he sets himself 
the task of determining, both in his writings as well as in his lectures, 
the context of meaning in which the concept of the subject could still 
be maintained as an effective and vital concept within the framework 
of the philosophical discourse. If the concept of the subject survives, 
there must be a concrete need for this survival! 
Let us return momentarily to the problem of philosophy and its 
re-foundation on four generic procedures in order to acknowledge 
the full consequences of Badiou’s remaking of the concept of the sub-
ject because only the concept of the generic procedure, as we have 
previously laid it out in conformity with Badiou’s general vision of re-
evaluating philosophy, “subsumes the disobjectivation of truth and of 
the subject, making the subject appear as a simple finite fragment of a 
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post-eventful truth without object” (Badiou 1999b: 93). Or as Badiou 
says elsewhere, the subject must be determined as “a finite moment 
of the generic procedure”, being thus always part of one of the four 
generic procedures and thus either “artistic, scientific, political or amo-
rous” (Badiou 1999b: 108). It is the generic that is common to those 
four procedures and to philosophy itself, because the generic is con-
cerned with what is yet to be determined and what is there only as the 
most general and anonymous element, to be experienced through the 
generic procedures (Badiou 2006: 45) and to be crystallised in truths 
resulting from those processes. It is thus the generic that makes phi-
losophy what it is, namely the re-thinking of the Platonic gesture split 
up between the procedures that support it. But how is this splitting-up 
to be understood and in what circumstances could the subject be cor-
related to such a “post-eventful truth without object”?  
Starting with the general ‘signifying structure’ of the subjective 
instance (which could equally be called ‘subjectivation’), one attains 
the crux of Badiou’s theory of the subject. This theory, and Badiou 
considers it as one of the central and permanent themes of his philo-
sophical thinking at least since his book Théorie du sujet, has nothing 
to do with neither the transcendental nor the substantial subject. Quite 
the contrary, its consistency is organised in time, it is entirely submit-
ted to the temporal modifications. As such, Badiou’s approach to the 
subject retains some obvious affinities with Michel Foucault’s concep-
tion of subjectivation. However, as Foucault points out (see 2000: 331), 
a clear distinction should still be maintained between subjectivation 
(in French ‘subjectivation’) and subjection (‘assujettissement’), in order 
to understand Badiou’s conception which is clearly oriented towards 
the first meaning, the latter being incorporated to the former rather 
symbolically. One of the most significant statements about the place 
or function of the subject can be found in one of his most recent major 
books, Logiques des mondes, in which he states that the way truths 
appear is singular and consists of subjective operations (Badiou 2006: 
16). That is to say there is no objective way for truths to be approached 
in their so-called eternity, truth is strictly a matter of appearing and 
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especially of revealing — subjective affirmation alone enables to con-
firm that there are truths. That is why there could be no truths without 
the subject: it is only through subjective operations that truths may be 
discerned, although these subjective operations do not presume, as 
one would imagine, any founded or substantialised subject. As Badiou 
maintains, truths have no existence of their own, they are at all times 
‘established’ by some subject (2006: 535) whose task consists of provi- 
ding assistance to enable their emergence. This is what the subjectiva-
tion in its broadest sense is about: organising an exception which fails 
to follow the rule.  
The unfounded character of the subject lies in the very heart of 
Badiou’s thought, it permits avoiding any tendency of uniformisation 
on the basis of the origin: every subject is by definition singular. So the 
question of the existence of some common nature shared by all subjects 
turns out to be rather meaningless. It could hardly be imagined that 
there exists any common nature beyond the concrete multiplicity the 
subject originates from. Furthermore, the subject thus apprehended 
has undoubtedly no underlying subjectivity of its own, his ‘subjecti- 
vity’ relies to a greater or lesser extent on its relationship with the generic 
instance it is related to within its multiple situation. Granted that 
there is no subjectivity independent from generic procedures through 
which the subject constitutes itself, the subject has no essence, no subs-
tance, no foundation, no transcendental structure, no knowledge of 
his own, which means that it is completely unsubstantiated and has 
no ontological meaning whatsoever before coming into contact with 
the event. This subject, determined first and foremost as completely 
formal, is unfounded and founds itself only on the fragments of a con-
sistency that Badiou, using his peculiar terminology, defines as that of 
fidelity. 
But how could this fidelity figure into the system of thought where 
the multiple is clearly privileged to the detriment of the unity and the 
One? Does fidelity not presume some kind of unity in or of the sub-
ject? In the case of Badiou’s thought, the unity of the subject has to be 
understood as barely formal, which implies that this unity is produced 
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and the subject subsists only as a productive and determining form that 
results in the very category of truth. The singularisation of a truth is 
thoroughly dependent on the singularisation of a subject who by its 
action bears witness to this truth through the category of fidelity. ‘Sin-
gularity’ should be identified as the key notion of this production: the 
subject, in order to be able to correlate itself to the event, must be able to 
complete and exceed the situation on the edge of which the event arises. 
Badiou continues to underline the primarily post-eventful character 
of the subject thus obtained: it is necessarily subordinated to the for-
tuitous element of a situation, to the multiple of the multiple. Only the 
event as a premise could lead to the formation of the subject because 
the latter is to be meticulously determined as an operative configura-
tion of the traces of the event (Badiou 2006: 42), meaning that there 
could be no subject without a previous event tracing a new configu-
ration on which the subject lays his claim and to which it is exposed 
in its very composition. So this type of subject could be established 
as belonging to the so-called eventful subjectivity: there is a subject 
so far as this subject belongs to some event. This subject, it must be 
insisted, carries in Badiou’s conception no meaning of his own (in the 
form of conscience and its correspondent constituting experience, as 
phenomenology would argue, in the form of some morally predisposed 
element, as neo-Kantians would argue or in the form of ideologically 
constructed representation, as disciples of Althusser might argue). It 
has meaning only insofar as it belongs to the faithful continuity of the 
event. 
Furthermore, it could be asked whether subjectivation can thus be 
identified with constitution? And is the subject both condemned to 
subjectivate and forced to constitute itself? If so, what is the element 
that activates these processes and bestows signification upon them? 
Certainly, this element is part of an event, but as neither physical entity 
nor biological being because, as we have underlined, the subject is far 
from being a substantial entity, rather it is a matter of composition and 
in all probability also that of decomposition. But this should not be 
taken literally: as the subject could not be substantial nor biological. 
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Badiou, inspired to some extent by Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalyti-
cal theory of the subject, undertakes to transform the subject from 
substantial to formal: the subject signifies precisely “a system of forms 
and operations” (Badiou 2006: 55), and there is no ultimate operation 
to be accomplished, no ultimate norm to be fixed. Even ethics, in quite 
a specific philosophical discourse as it was proposed by Emmanuel 
Lévinas (1994), manifests its insufficiency to assure the production of 
such ultimate operations and norms, for the simple reason that the sub-
ject could possibly fail to apply the law in question, that is to say, the 
law of the Other (see Badiou 2003: 36). Ethical systems, being by their 
nature very complex and potentially efficient normative organisations, 
are still but abstractions of particular situations, in need of agents likely 
to intervene in these situations.
Badiou’s goal in his work Logiques des mondes is to initiate a theory 
of the subject which takes account of the formal character of the sub-
ject since this subject, being both formal and composed and with 
no substantiated nature of its own, could not constitute an empiri-
cally determinable object. Nevertheless, for Badiou it turns out to be 
a highly significant and even singular instance. The singularity here 
consists in the affirmation of the incalculable, which in the absence 
of objectively verifiable criteria enables one to make statements about 
truth and to be situated in view of its value. There is something that can 
be thought as an event, so one considers the event having taken place. 
One thus accepts the implications (at least some of them) of this event 
and re-composes oneself (one’s thought, one’s actions, one’s being) as 
the subject related or even allied to the event concerned, entering, as 
Badiou puts it, into the composition of the subject (Badiou 2003: 60).  
Is the subject thus constructed always as a positive entity in Badiou’s 
eyes? Not necessarily, in addition to the faithful subject Badiou disco-
vers, there are two other forms of subject that he calls respectively ‘the 
reactive subject’ and ‘the obscure subject’ which are to be discerned as 
essentially unproductive forms (they are merely passive bodies rather 
than subjects) because they deny the power of the event for the pre-
sent and either fail to recognize it or project it into some idealized 
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transcendence. The so-called positively conceived subject thus exer-
cises and in the end realizes his fidelity in the aftermath of an event, by 
the pure fact of being faithful to the event whose existence, as Badiou 
underlines, can by no means be calculated or demonstrated and whose 
character is still to be determined. This is to say as well that this cha-
racter cannot be established once and for all, its determination is in fact 
an endless (that is to say, properly infinite) process of re-examining and 
re-thinking the truth enclosed in the traces of  the event. 
The task of affirming the event and thinking truth is assigned to the 
subject who, testing them in a multiple situation, is confronted with 
two indiscernible or incalculable terms: he must make a choice, which 
means, in Badiou’s terms, that the subject is nothing but a throw of 
the dice, fixing the chance through a concrete throw and establishing 
for a while a radically finite and tangible combination of an infinite 
series. This is why Badiou may be justified to declare himself as both 
post-Cartesian and post-Lacanian thinker: he introduces a radical 
dividing-line between the fundamental categories of being and truth 
which permits him to identify the subject not as a support or an origin, 
but as a fragment of the processes of truth (Badiou 1988: 22). Subjec-
tivation as a process implies that the subject in question is both local 
(by its status) and in surplus (vis-à-vis the situation, see Badiou 1988: 
430).  The subject is the product of a compound subjectivation which 
means that there are in fact four types of subjectivation to be identified, 
in conformity with four conditions of philosophy as displayed at the 
outset. For instance, there are militant activists who enter the composi-
tion of militant or political organization, there are artists who enter the 
composition of artistic production and of a work of art, etc. Indeed, the 
subject is to be understood as a militant, subjectivating and organiza-
tional form of artistic, scientific, political and affectionate activity and 
of the determination of the indiscernible character of an event that con-
fers meaning to this activity. The subject, Badiou maintains (2006: 80), 
is primarily of political, artistic, scientific or affectionate composition, 
due to which there remains no such entity as the purely philosophi-
cal subject. The implications that could be logically deduced from his 
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formal theory of the subject seem to be highly relevant to Badiou’s own 
social and political commitments. 
Conclusion
In this article, we have studied the intricate tripartite relationship 
between the notions of truth, the subject and the event as depicted 
in Badiou’s thought: there is an indiscernible and incalculable event, 
completed by a finite subject aiming at understanding the infinite 
truth of the event and determined to be faithful to its implications. 
These notions acquire their full signification only through their mutual 
counteraction without which each element taken separately remains in 
the realm of ambiguity that may only be overcome by interrelating each 
constituent meaning into signifying whole. And we would like to know 
how is it that from something quite indiscernible and incalculable, one 
would arrive at a cleavage between the finite instance of the subject and 
the infinite process of truth? In keeping with Badiou’s general vision, 
we would deduce that the subject is composed as a finite moment on 
the path leading to truth, the latter being infinite in the sense that it is 
not attainable by superposing those determinate moments. And para-
doxically it seems to lead to the upshot that the infinite is somehow 
made up of absolutely finite sequences. One of the major difficulties to 
which Badiou’s thought is deliberately exposed concerns precisely the 
conceptual fissure bringing together the finite and the infinite and the 
way the finite is effectively submitted to the infinite. But this fissure, as 
Badiou in all probability will maintain, is precisely the fissure through 
which the subject comes forth.
79The conceptual structure of Alain Badiou's theory of the subject
References
Althusser, Louis 2003. The Humanist Controversy. London: Verso.
Badiou, Alain 1988. L’être et l’événement. Paris: Seuil.
— 1997. Saint Paul. La fondation de l’universalisme. Paris: PUF
— 1999a. Deleuze: The Clamour of Being. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.
— 1999b. Manifesto for Philosophy. New York: State University of New York Press
— 2003. L’Ethique. Essai sur la conscience du mal. Caen: Nous.
— 2004. Theoretical Writings. London: Continuum.
— 2006. Logiques des mondes. (L’être et l’événement 2). Paris: Seuil.
Deleuze, Gilles 1968. Différence et répétition. Paris: PUF
Foucault, Michel 2000. Power. Essential Works of Foucault, Vol. 3. New York: The 
New Press.
Lévinas, Emmanuel 1994. Humanisme de l’autre homme. Paris: Le Livre de Poche.
Что означет ‘субъект’? Концептульная структура теории субъекта 
Алена Бадью
Статья рассматривает основные понятия философии субъекта Але-
на Бадью, следуя за ее сложными импликациями, выражающимися в 
критике, направленной против философской софистики, которая от-
рицает применимость понятия истины. Философская инновация Ба-
дью опирается на три ключевые понятия — истина, событие и субъ-
ект. В статье  прослеживается, как эти понятия организованы и как 
они соотносятся, что приводит к переосмыслению понятия субъекта. 
Философия соприкасается в своем бытии с математикой, искусством, 
любовью и политикой, которые можно трактовать как общие при-
чины, на границе которых действует философская мысль. Отделив 
философию от онтологии и сделав задачей философии преодоление 
бытия, Бадью превращает философию в общую теорию события. 
Этим понятие субъекта отделяется от понятия объекта, субъект не 
является основой знания, он всегда — часть генерических процедур 
и этим дефинируется как  окончательный фрагмент или действующая 
конфигурация следов события. Таким образом, процесс субъектива-
ции можно связать с процессом семиозиса.   
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Mida tähistab ‘subjekt’? Filosoofilis-semiootiline sissevaade Alain 
Badiou’ sündmuseteooria tähendusse
Artikkel esitab ja uurib mõningaid Alain Badiou’ filosoofia põhimõisteid, 
jälgides selle keerulisi implikatsioone, mis leiavad väljenduse filosoofilise 
sofistika vastu suunatud kriitikas. See sofistika eitab tõe mõiste asjakoha-
sust. Badiou filosoofiline innovatsioon toetub kolmele võtmemõistele, 
milleks on tõde, sündmus ja subjekt. Artikkel püüab vaadelda, kuidas eel-
mainitud mõisted on tähenduslikult organiseeritud ja omavahel seostatud 
teatavas filosoofilist laadi semioosises, mis viib välja subjekti mõiste ümber-
mõtestamiseni. Oma toimimises on filosoofia lähedalt seotud nelja külgne-
va toiminguga, milleks on matemaatika, kunst, armastus ja poliitika, mida 
võib mõista kui üleüldisi tingimusi, mille piiril filosoofiline mõtlemine aset 
leiab. Eraldades filosoofia ontoloogiast ja tehes filosoofia ülesandeks selle, 
mis ületab olemise, muudab Badiou filosoofia sündmuse üldiseks teooriaks. 
Seega seotakse subjekti mõiste lahti objekti mõistest, subjekt ei ole teadmise 
alus, vaid alati osa geneerilistest toimingutest ja sellega defineeritav lihtsalt 
kui sündmuse jälgede lõplik fragment või toimiv konfiguratsioon. Nii võiks 
subjektivatsiooniprotsessi seostada semioosiprotsessiga, mida peetakse 
semiootika üheks keskseks mõisteks.
